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NOTES
THE 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF TITLE VII:
WHERE WE ARE, WHERE WE'VE BEEN, AND
WHERE WE MAY GO
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prohibit discrimination in the employment context.' Since its enactment,
the broad language of Title VII has been litigated to precisely define its
meaning. The Supreme Court, from the 1970s through the late 1980s,
went beyond the plain statutory language of Title VII and expanded the
ways in which a plaintiff may bring a claim. 2 The best example of this,
sharply criticized as legislation from the bench, is the creation of the
"disparate impact doctrine." 3 After a series of cases defining the
disparate impact doctrine, all analyzed in turn in this note, Congress
stepped in and amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991 not only to give the
disparate impact doctrine a formal statutory basis, but to "restor[e] the
civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by [Supreme
Court] decisions." 4 Since the 1991 Amendments, the disparate impact
concept has been expanded to other anti-discrimination contexts as
well.5
We begin this note by providing a historical background to Title
VII, both its legislative history and the socio-political climate in which it
was enacted. We then examine the plain language of the statute.6 Next,

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
2. Through its decisions from the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Court has considered disparate treatment, disparate impact, and affirmative action claims. Each will
be examined in turn in this note. See infra Parts I-VI.
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
4. Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearing before the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 3 (1991) [hereinafter Hearingson H.R. 1].
5. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (making disparate impact
applicable to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
6. See infra Part 11.
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we analyze the Supreme Court's 1971 decision, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and its progeny, which judicially created and defined the disparate
impact doctrine. 7 In our analysis, we consider the ideological make-up
of the Supreme Court and the particular philosophical tendencies of the
individual Justices. The series of cases developing the disparate impact
doctrine serve as a window to analyze the judicial decision-making
processes of the bench and view the ideological conflicts that exist
among its members.
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codifying the
disparate impact doctrine, Title VII litigation has shifted focus to the
application of the statute of limitations imposed on plaintiffs under the
statute. The series of cases leading up to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.8 demonstrates the clash of political ideologies on the bench
and how Congress has stepped in to resolve them through the enactment
of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009.9
The development of both the disparate impact and Ledbetter line of
cases demonstrate the political attitudes and influences that seep into
judicial decision-making, even at the Supreme Court level. The
development of these areas in Title VII is also a concrete example of
how our system of checks and balances works, as Congress has stepped
in when there is legislation from the bench that has arguably gone too
far.
We will conclude this note by looking specifically at the year 2009,
a year marking the 45th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title VII.' 0 President Barack Obama took office in January of 2009, and
since he began his presidency, he has played a crucial role in shaping
labor and employment law and policy. In less than one year, President
Obama has signed into law the Fair Pay Act, 1 appointed Hilda Solis to
his Cabinet as Secretary of Labor, 2 and has appointed liberal Justice
Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court.' 3 It will be interesting to see
what the future holds.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Parts I-IV.
550 U.S. 618 (2007).
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
See infra Part VIII.
Fred Lucas, Obama Signs Fair Pay Act - His Female Staffers Made 78% of Males' Pay in

Senate, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.cnsnews.comPublic/contentl/article.aspx?RsrclD=42747.
of
Labor,
the
Secretary
of
Office
Labor
Dep't
of
12. U.S.
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/welcome.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
13. See Peter Hamby et al., Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to Supreme Court,
CNN.com, May 26, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/supreme.court/index.html.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/5

2

Crabtree and Stock: The 45Th Anniversary of Title VII: Where We are, Where We've Been

20101

THE 45THANNIVERSARY OF TITLE VII

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII AND THE BIRTH OF
DISPARATE IMPACT

"Title VII' 14 seems to be more than just a single provision of a
larger Act of Congress; it has a significance all its own. It carries with it
a force and recognition on par with the entire Act itself as its purpose
was to remedy pervasive employment inequality deeply rooted in
American business and society on the whole.' 5 The language of section
703(a) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to (1) fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.16

As a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII works as one
piece of a comprehensive legislative scheme to put an end to racial
inequality by making employment decisions based on race, national
origin, or sex illegal.17 The 1960s were a tumultuous time wrought with
extreme social and political tension, but also a time when the civil rights
movement saw great transformation.' 8 When deliberating over the
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
15. See Raymond J. Celada, Equal Employment Opportunity: Legislative History and
Analysis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in MAJOR STUDIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE SERVICE/CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1-2 (1975)

[hereinafter Equal

Employment Opportunity]. "It is widely contended that discrimination in employment is the most
pervasive and pernicious practice affecting minorities, above all Negroes, in contemporary
American life." Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; see also Equal Employment Opportunity, supra note
15 (detailing the eleven titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all of which are concerned with racial
discrimination all facets of human life).
18. During the Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s through the 1960s, the Supreme
Court was in support of eliminating racial discrimination in all realms. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (protecting the equal right of African
Americans to travel); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (desegregating public
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enactment of Title VII, Senator Humphrey, principal floor leader on the
measure, stated, "[t]he goals of this bill are simple ones: To extend to
Negro citizens the same opportunities that white Americans take for
granted." 19 President Kennedy also reflected on the particular cruelty of
discrimination in the employment context commenting:
In many of our larger cities, both North and South, the number of
jobless Negro youth--often 20 percent or more-creates an
atmosphere of frustration, resentment, and unrest which does not bode
well for the future .... Employment opportunities moreover, play a
major role in determining whether . . .[rights like voting, public

accommodations, etc.] are meaningful. There is little value in a
Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted
to hotels and restaurants if
20
he has no cash in his pocket and no job.
The fight for civil rights of all Americans was not borne by
Congress alone. On the contrary, it was the plight of all branches of the
federal government acting as one. 21 The Supreme Court, at the time of
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, was presided over by Chief
Justice Earl Warren.22 The Warren Court transformed the law in the
areas of freedom of speech, rights of criminal suspects, and the then
emerging field of an individual's right to privacy.23 However, it was not
until 1971, after conservative Chief Justice Warren Burger had taken the
reigns, that a case involving racial discrimination in the employment
context was brought before the Supreme Court, Griggs v. Duke Power

schools). Participants in the Civil Rights Movement also utilized non-violent, social protests to
achieve their goals. See John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, JFK in History: Civil
Rights
Context
in
the
Early
1960's,
http://www.jfklibrary.org[Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Civi+Rights+Context+in+the+Ear
ly+1960s+Page+4.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2009).
19. Equal Employment Opportunity, supra note 15, at 1.
20. Id. at 2.
21. See Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, I PUB. PAPERS
237 (June 1I,1963). Discouraged by the violent protests that had ensued he addressed the nation on
June 11,1963 asking for public support for Congress to pass a major new bill dealing with voting
rights, public accommodations, desegregation of schools, establishment of a Community Relations
Service, continuation of the Civil Rights Commission, nondiscrimination in federally assisted
programs, and, most notably for the purposes of the history of Title VII, the formation of the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission. Id.
22. See
Federal
Judicial
Center,
Judges
of the United
States
Courts,
http://www.fjc.gov/serlet/tgetinfo?jid+2506 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). Earl Warren served as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1974. Id.
23. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE I I (Random House 2008). See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protecting rights of criminal suspects); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (judicially creating an individual's right to privacy).
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By the time Chief Justice Burger took over, the political ideology
of the Court,
and the country for that matter, had dramatically shifted to
25
the right.
The facts of Griggs are straightforward. The plaintiff, Willie
Griggs, filed a class action lawsuit challenging the employment practice
at Duke Power Company that required a high school diploma and the
passage of two separate aptitude tests for promotion.26 The District
Court dismissed Mr. Griggs' claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding no unlawful intentionaldiscriminatory practices, as the company
policy was facially neutral.2 7 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
and found that Duke Power Company's policy, although not
28
Co. 2 4

intentionally discriminatory, did in fact have a discriminatory effect.

Specifically, the Griggs Court concluded that where a facially neutral
employment practice has a disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities ("disparate impact"), that practice cannot be used unless it is
justified under a standard that came to be known as "business
necessity., 29 This unanimous decision vastly expanded individual rights
under Title VII by allowing discrimination claims based on a new
The Griggs decision "turned this
theory, "disparate impact. 3 °
unequivocally colorblind statute into31 a device for promoting racial
balancing and preferential treatment.,
The Griggs Court did not stand firmly on precedent or legislative
direction from Title VII itself, but instead took a "pragmatic" approach
to reach its conclusion, finding a legal basis in what it deemed the "spirit
of the Act.",32 This approach was the source of scathing criticism. 33 Paul

24.

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

25. TOOBIN, supra note 23, at 11. Then President Nixon won on a platform of revitalizing
conservativism and reigning in the liberalism of the bench from the Warren-era. Id. at 12.
26. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
27. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).

28. See id. at 432 (emphasis added). "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
29. Id. at 431.
30. Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv.249,264(2004).

31.

Id. at 263.

32. Michael Evan Gold, Griggs'Folly:An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the
Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination, and a Recommendation for Reform, 7
INDus. REL. L.J. 429, 479-81 (1985).

[lI]nstead of citations to legislative history or precedent or even legal theory, one finds
only a few undocumented assertions.... The court cited not a line in a committee report,
not a colloquy on the floor of either house of Congress, not the testimony of a witness
before a committee, not even the report of ajournalist in a newspaper.
Id. at 480-81.
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Burstein, Adjunct Professor at the University of Washington, wrote,
"[i]ndeed, the relevant evidence conclusively reveals a Congressional
intent exactly obverse from that which the court asserted. 34 Even more
interesting, from a political standpoint, Burstein found that although the
case was decided during a time when the Court was moving toward a
more "cautious approach to Constitutional issues," Griggs was a
"sensitive, liberal" interpretation of Title VII. 35 Not only was the Griggs
standard problematic from a legal standpoint, but also in practice, as
employers found themselves with a need to balance their workforce in
terms of minority representation in order to avoid discrimination claims
based on this new type of discrimination.36 The disparate impact
doctrine functionally imposed a quota system on employers, leaving the
door open for whites to bring claims after being displaced from their
jobs in an effort to equalize the workforce. 37 Therefore, although the
Court attempted to remain constant in its commitment to the civil rights
movement and the legislative purpose of Title VII, the Griggs standard
led to a wave of litigation in the years to follow due to its ambiguities
and the practical difficulties in its application.38
III. WILLIAM HUBBS REHNQUIST JOINS THE BENCH

William Hubbs Rehnquist was nominated to the Supreme Court by
President Nixon and took his seat as Associate Justice on January 7,
1972, just shy of one year after Griggs was decided.39 Prior to his
appointment, Rehnquist had served in the United States Air Force in
World War II, graduated from Stanford University and later Harvard
Graduate School and Stanford Law School, served as law clerk to
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, and served as Assistant

33. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 30, at 264-65.
34. United States Department of Justice: Office of Legal Policy, Redefining Discrimination:
"DisparateImpact" and the Institutionalization of Affirmative Action, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 121, 126 (Paul Burstein
ed., 1994) [hereinafter Redefining Discrimination].
35. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination,in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY, supra note 34, at
107.
36. Redefining Discrimination,supra note 34, at 126.

37. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 224-25 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
39. Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited April 10, 2010).
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Attorney General in the State of Arizona from 1969-1971.40 He quickly
established himself as a conservative justice, voting against women's
abortion rights, further desegregation policies for public schools, prayer
in schools, capital punishment and states' rights.4 '
In 1979, United Steelworkers v. Weber was decided.4 2 Rehnquist's
dissent in this decision earned him a coveted spot on the cover of Time
Magazine accompanied by the headline "Reagan's Mr. Right. '' 3
Rehnquist's dissent found Title VII's prohibition of all discrimination
meant no discrimination was permitted, whether targeted at whites or at
blacks.44 He denounced the quota system established in Griggs, stating
"[tihere is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion of equality
than the numerus clausus-the quota. Whether described as 'benign
discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is nonetheless a
creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean one in order to
prefer another., 45 In contrast to the majority in Weber, Rehnquist's
dissent showed he favored merit-based hiring and promotion practices, a
largely pro-employer stance.46
Weber was a landmark decision because it was the first affirmative
action employment case to reach the Supreme Court.47 It is also
regarded as one of the principal cases in federal statutory

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
43. Evan Thomas, Reagan's Mr. Right, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 24, available at
http://www.time.corm/time/magazine/article/0,9171,961645-1,00.html.
44. Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 254.
46. See id. at219-55.
47. See Lund, supra note 30, at 266. The Weber decision came on the coattails of Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978), which dealt with affirmative action in student
admissions to the medical school at the University of California, a public institution. Justice
Powell's decision in Bakke has been summarized as:
Justice Powell, who wrote only for himself but nonetheless controlled the outcome in
Bakke, reached an arguably moderate, perhaps a compromise, position on affirmative
action in publication education. On one hand, Justice Powell condemned racial quotas,
such as the one used by the medical school, even if the quota was designed to ensure
minority representation in the student body rather than to exclude historically
disadvantaged persons. On the other hand, Powell endorsed admission plans in use at
elite private universities that considered the overall diversity of the student body, racial
and otherwise, as a factor in making admission decisions. He did so because he thought
"diversity" in the educational setting was a compelling governmental interest and that
using race as a "plus" factor was a reasonable means for attempting to effectuate that
interest.
Philip P. Frickey, John Minor Wisdom Lecture: Wisdom on Weber, 74 TuL. L. REV. 1169, 1174
(2000).
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interpretation. 48 The racial quota that was a direct result of the
"disparate impact" doctrine created in Griggs was challenged in Weber
by an employee who argued he would have otherwise been admitted to
the Kaiser Aluminum training program but for his race. 49 Specifically,
the affirmative action policy at issue reserved half of the spaces in its
training program for black employees to increase the number of the
company's black skilled workers and meet the statutory minimum.5 °
The Supreme Court held that the employer's policy did not violate Title
VII when read against the backdrop of legislative history and in the
"spirit" of the Act, as it was decided that when an employer's hiring plan
is "voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns51
of racial segregation" it is permissible and not a violation of Title VII.
The majority concluded that since the plan did not call for displacement
of white workers to make room for blacks and did not bar advancement
of already employed white workers it was lawful.52 Further, the decision
stated that Kaiser's plan was to be implemented temporarily and solely
with the purpose of remedying racial imbalance, but not with the purpose
of establishing a quota to maintain racial balance.53
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion follows much of the same logic of
the critique of Griggs, the case upon which the majority places heavy
reliance.54 Rehnquist argued that the majority relied not on the statutory
language, as the Court deemed it ambiguous, but instead relied on an
amorphous concept it deemed the "spirit" of Title VII. 55 However, the
language the drafters of Title VII crafted is arguably unambiguous and
therefore, as Rehnquist makes clear in his dissent, based on the rules of
statutory interpretation when analyzing Title VII, the plain language
should not be overlooked.56 Rehnquist argued:

48.
49.

Frickey, supra note 47, at 1171 & n.9.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 199-200.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 198.
Id. at 201,208.
id. at 208.
Id.

54.

Id. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also discussion of Griggs critique, supra Part

1.
55. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Accordingly, without even a
break in syntax, the Court rejects 'a literal construction of § 703(a)' in favor of newly discovered
'legislative history'... " Id. It is important to note that Griggs was decided before Rehnquist's
appointment to the Court. It is also a point of analysis that Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority
opinion in Griggs, which has been criticized as not being well-founded in any of the traditional legal
bases, however in Weber, Burger joined Rehnquist in the dissent. Id. at 219-55.
56. See id. at 222.
Thus, by a tour deforce reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes,
but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language,
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[T]he legislative history invoked by the Court to avoid the plain
language of §§703 (a) and (d) simply misses the point. To be sure, the
reality of employment discrimination against Negroes provided the
primary impetus for passage of Title VII. But this fact by no means
to leave employers
supports the proposition that Congress intended
57
free to discriminate against white persons.
This opinion is an example of Rehnquist's strictly plain language
approach to statutory interpretation. Because the explicit statutory text
does not leave room for such a result, Rehnquist could not join in the
majority opinion in Weber.58 He saw this decision as a clear case of
legislating from the bench and an infringement on the fundamental
separation of powers. 59 Furthermore, Rehnquist reasoned that in light of
the legislative purpose of Title VII, the prohibition of discrimination of
any group in the workplace, the type of reverse discrimination at issue in
Weber, is just what Congress intended to prohibit. 60 Rehnquist found:
The evil inherent in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based
on an immutable characteristic, utterly irrelevant to employment
decisions. The characteristic becomes no less immutable and
irrelevant, and discrimination based thereon becomes no less evil,
the person excluded is a member of one race rather
simply because
61
than another.

As evidence that he thought the Griggs Court was impermissibly
legislating from the bench, Rehnquist commented that he would have
likely voted in favor of the result the majority reaches in Weber had he
voted for it on the floor of Congress.62
IV. REHNQUIST'S

ELEVATION TO CHIEF JUSTICE

Seven years after the Supreme Court's decision in Weber, in 1986,
the country was operating within a very different political landscape than
in 1979, as Republican President Ronald Reagan was already in his

'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent in concluding that employers
are, after all, permitted to consider race in making employment decisions.
Id.
57. Id. at 228-29.
58. See id. at 228. "Quite simply, Kaiser's racially discriminatory admission quota is flatly
prohibited by the plain language of Title VII." Id.
59. See idat 228 & n.9 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917)).
60. Id. at 230.
61. Id.at228n.10.
62. Id.
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second term of office.63 However, it was not until 1986 that President
Reagan made one of "[tihe most valuable and lasting contribution[s] of
his presidency," when Associate Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief
Justice. 64 Later that same year, through a wave of federal judicial
appointments, Antonin Scalia joined the bench as an Associate Justice.65
Rehnquist had a new-found political ally in Scalia, however, the
Supreme Court bench in 1986 was still characterized as liberal, although
only slightly liberal.66 In fact, it was the liberal majority joined by swing
voters O'Connor and Powell who carried the day in the Title VII
decision, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 67 decided in March of
1987.68

In Johnson, plaintiff-petitioner Paul Johnson, a white male, brought
suit against the Transportation Agency under Title VII for discrimination
on the basis of his sex.69 In 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy for a
The Equal Employment Opportunity
road dispatcher position.70
Commission ("EEOC") designated the position as one for a "Skilled
Craft Worker.",7'
Twelve employees applied for the promotion,
including Diane Joyce, the only female applicant, who was ultimately
selected.72
Both Joyce and Johnson were designated as "wellqualified. 7 3 Johnson alleged the sole reason Joyce was chosen for the
position was because it was in accordance with the Agency's affirmative

63. In 1979, when Weber was decided, the country was in the midst of the 1980 Presidential
election campaign. President Reagan was up against incumbent Democratic President Jimmy
Carter. By 1986, Reagan was in his second term after a "reelection landslide" that was viewed as
"an enthusiastic expression of hope for continuance of the state of economic well-being and
patriotic euphoria in which Americans, by and large, found themselves in late 1984." Coral Bell,
From Carter to Reagan, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 490,490 (1984).
64. Tony Mauro, Reagan's Legacy: A Transformed Judiciary, LAW.COM, June 14, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1086989271386.
65. Id.
66. In 1986, the Supreme Court bench consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
Justice O'Connor, Justice White, Justice Powell, Justice Stevens, Justice Blackmun, Justice
Brennan, and Justice Marshall. Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme
Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited April 10,
2010).
67. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
68. Id. at 616.
69. Id. at 619.
70. Id. at 623.
71. Id. To challenge an employment practice that one believes is in violation of Title VII, the
person must first file a charge with the EEOC, the federal agency that handles workplace
discrimination complaints. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Laws
ProhibitingJob Discrimination Questions and Answers, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2010).
72. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 623.
73. Id. at 625.
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action plan, which he claimed was unlawfully discriminatory under Title
VII. 74 The Supreme Court ultimately held in favor of the Agency,
deciding that although the Agency's plan was not implemented to
remedy past discrimination, this was because there were no women
present in the skilled craft positions at that time.75 Thus, the Court
found, as it did in Weber, that "[Title VII] does not absolutely prohibit
preferential hiring in favor of minorities; it was merely intended to
protect historically disadvantaged groups against discrimination and not
to hamper managerial efforts to benefit members of disadvantaged
groups that are consistent with that paramount purpose.' 7 6
The Court in Johnson expanded the application of the affirmative
action model, originally defined in Weber in two key ways. First, the
Court extended the application of the Weber framework to public
employers.77 Second, it loosened the requirements for an employer to
lawfully implement an affirmative action plan by not requiring proof that
the plan was created to remedy past discriminatory practices.78
Specifically, the Court held, as it did in Weber, that employers may
engage in voluntary affirmative action plans to remedy past
discrimination and equalize the racial balance of the workforce as long
as the purposes of the plan mirror those of Title VII. 79 Additionally, the
plan may not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white
employees ...[and may] not require the discharge of white workers and
their replacement with new black hires. 'Nor did the plan create' an
absolute bar to the advancement of white employees. 8 ° Justice Scalia
viewed the Johnson majority's decision much as Rehnquist viewed the
outcome of Weber. In fact, Rehnquist joined Scalia in his dissent in
Johnson, arguing for Weber to be overruled entirely. 8' Through his
strongly worded critique of Johnson, Scalia accused the majority of
"complet[ing] the process of converting [Title VII] from a guarantee that
74.

Id.

75. Id. at 624, 637.
76. Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 627-28 & n.6. Just one term prior, the Court held that racial classifications for
employment in a public school setting were a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a
compelling government interest. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986).
Johnson was a case brought under Title VII and one question before the Court was whether the
statutory definition of "employer" under Title VII included public employers. See Johnson, 480
U.S. at 627 n.6.
78. See id. at 632, 636-37. All that is required is that an employer take into account numerous
factors in making hiring decisions and not just engage in"blind hiring" based on a simple imbalance
in the workforce. Id. at 636.
79. Id. at 628.
80. Id. at 630 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
81. Id. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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race or sex will not be the basis for employment determinations, to a
guarantee that it often will. '82

Justice Scalia went on to state, "we

effectively replace the goal of a discrimination-free society with the
quite incompatible goal of proportionate representation by race and by
sex in the workplace. 83 Further, he recognized
Rehnquist's dissent in
84
Weber as being "literally unanswered.,
Justice Scalia began his dissent in Johnson with the type of sarcasm
that pervades the entire opinion: "[w]ith a clarity which, had it not
proven so unavailing, one might well recommend as a model of statutory
draftsmanship, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares ....85
He asserted that not only should Weber itself be overruled but, even as it
stands as relevant precedent, the Court is not following its holding.86 He
argues that:
The most significant proposition of law established by [the majority]
decision is that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title
VII when it is intended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's
own discrimination, but of societal attitudes that have limited
the entry
87
of certain races, or of a particular sex, into certain jobs.
The dissent went on to note that the reason women were
underrepresented in the Agency's road dispatcher category is that
women themselves did not see it as desirable work.88 He asserted that it
was an "alteration of social attitudes, rather than the elimination of
discrimination, which [the majority's] decision approves as justification
for state-enforced discrimination.,' 89 Justice Scalia went on to call the
holding an "enormous expansion, undertaken without the slightest
justification or analysis."9
Through a series of cases leading up to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Rehnquist Court worked to legitimate and clarify
the judicially-created disparate impact framework as well as affirmative

82. Id. at 658.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 665 n.3.
85. Id. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 670 ("It would be better, in my view, to acknowledge [Weber] as fully
applicable precedent, and to use the Fourteenth Amendment ramifications-which Weber did not
address and which are implicated for the first time here-as the occasion for reconsidering and
overruling it.").
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id. at 668.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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action in the employment context. 91 These cases, according to some
opinions, were based largely on the legislative history and "spirit" of
Title VII rather than the plain statutory language itself.92 To analyze the
Court's struggle between those justices advocating for the expansion of
Title VII's application and those staunchly in favor of a strict plain
language interpretation of the statute, a closer look at two decisions,
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust CO. 9 3 and Ward's Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio94 is warranted.
V. THE BUILD UP TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in Watson, a
decision that expanded the disparate impact theory, previously only
applicable to objective selection practices by employers, to apply to
subjective selection practices as well. 95 She wrote:
[W]e note that the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case
goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the
employer's workforce. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the
specific employment practice that is challenged .... Especially in cases
where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of more
rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible
for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices
that are
96
allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.
In Watson, the Petitioner, a black employee, was passed over four
times for promotion by the Fort Worth Bank & Trust.97 There was no
evidence that she was less qualified than the white employees who were
ultimately selected based on the subjective determinations of white
supervisors. 98 There was no formal employment policy in place at the
time of the adverse decisions, but instead, the Bank found that since the
supervisors were best acquainted with the job candidates and were
familiar with the nature of the jobs to be filled they were in the best

91. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
92.

See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. 657-75 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55

(Rehnquist, J. dissenting); see also discussion of the critique of Griggs, supra Part 1.
93. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
94. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
95. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.
96. Id. at 994.
97. Id. at 982.
98. See id.
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position to make employment decisions. 99 The District Court, utilizing

the individual disparate treatment model of analysis set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 0 0 allowed the plaintiff to proceed

with her individual claims and found that she had made out her prima
facie case.' 0 ' The burden of production then shifted to the defendant to
show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision.'1 2 The
District Court, in this case, found that the plaintiff did not meet this final
burden of showing the non-discriminatory
reason was but a pretext for
03
discrimination and dismissed the action.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Watson argued that her case should
have instead been analyzed under the disparate impact model, discussed
04
in Griggs.1

The Fifth Circuit held that a challenge to a subjective

promotion system can only be analyzed under the disparate treatment
model, and thereby, affirmed the lower court's decision.10 5

The

Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether this was the correct
conclusion in light of other circuits finding that disparate impact could,
in fact, apply to subjective hiring practices.10 6 The Supreme Court
ultimately held that the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies

to subjective hiring10 7practices just as it does to objective practices and
remanded the case.
In articulating her rationale behind applying disparate impact
analysis to cases in which the alleged discrimination was through the

vehicle of a subjective or discretionary hiring practice, Justice O'Connor
noted that to hold otherwise could abolish the entire disparate impact
model.' 0 8 Employers would be able to combine a subjective element to

their objective hiring practices and circumvent any disparate impact

99. Id.
100. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This case established a burden-shifting framework for individual
disparate treatment cases. First, the plaintiff has the burden of meeting the elements of the prima
facie case, namely that he or she applied, was qualified, and was passed over for the position. Id. at
802. Then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. Finally the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant employer's articulated
reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
101. Watson, 487 U.S. at 983-84.
102. Id. at 984; see also McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
103. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984.
104. Id. at 984; see also discussion supra Part II.
105. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984.
106. Id. at 984-85; see, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (1lth Cir. 1985); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
107. Watson, 487 U.S. at 999-1000.
108. Id. at 990.
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challenges.10 9 Further, Justice O'Connor argued that in principle, a
disparate impact analysis should be no less applicable to subjective
employment criteria since, "[i]n either case, a facially neutral practice,
adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are
indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices.""1 0
The Court went on to highlight that the expansion of disparate
impact would not have a "chilling effect" on business practices, as there
is a high threshold level of proof required for a plaintiff to sustain his
burden."' Specifically, when subjective practices are at issue, not only
must a plaintiff show a statistical disparity, but the showing must be "of
a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of
their membership in a protected group." ' 12 The defendant is at all times
free to rebut this evidence, making it a difficult burden for the plaintiff to
bear and reducing the possibility, according to the1 3plurality, that there
will be seriously detrimental business implications.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence criticizes the majority conclusion
by arguing that the proof structure established by the plurality,
increasing the burden on the plaintiff, is an incorrect mimicking of the
allocation of the burden of proof in what he deems "the very different
context" of disparate treatment cases. 14 He argues, and Justices
Brennan and Marshall agree, that when the plaintiff establishes the
elements of the prima facie case through a showing of sufficient
statistical evidence, the burden of proof not simply the burden of
production, shifts to the employer." 5 Justice Blackmun goes on to argue
that the employer must prove that the proffered business necessity must
"directly relate to a prospective employee's ability to perform the job
effectively."" 16
With this decision, the Court pushed the bounds of the Title VII
framework established to date. The scathing criticisms in Weber by
Justice Rehnquist and in Johnson by Justice Scalia were absent from this
decision, as both voted with the plurality."1 7 In fact, there was no dissent
in this case.11 8 Watson is clearly an expansion of the disparate impact
109. Id.
110.

Id.

Ill. Id. at 993-94.
112. Id. at 994.
113. Id. at 994-96.
114.
115.
116.

Id.at 1002.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1005.

117.

id. at 981.

118.

Id.
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doctrine that Justice Rehnquist, just fifteen years prior, criticized as
having no legal foundation." 9 The combined effect of Watson and
Ward's Cove, discussed below, ultimately pushed Congress to check the
unbridled discretion
the Supreme Court seemed to be taking in analyzing
20
Title VII cases.
In the 1989 case, Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Supreme
Court scaled back its holding in Watson and decided that the plaintiffs
proffered statistical evidence did not establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact under Title VII.12 1 The plaintiffs in this case were
122
Alaskan cannery workers, employed seasonally for the salmon runs.
At issue was the racial disparity between the company's two
23
employment classifications: cannery and noncannery positions.1
Cannery positions were generally filled by non-white, Filipino and
Alaskan workers, while the non-cannery positions were predominately
held by whites. 24 The plaintiffs, non-white cannery workers, brought a
Title VII action alleging that the employer's hiring practices led to
"nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria,
separate hiring channels, a practice of not promoting from within-were
responsible for the racial stratification of the work force ....
The
Court of Appeals held that the comparison between the racial
compositions of the cannery workforce to the non-cannery workforce
was enough to make out a prima facie case in the disparate treatment
26
context. 1
The Supreme Court, however, analyzed the disparate impact
challenge looking to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Watson. 127 Under
Watson, the plaintiff bears the burden of going beyond statistical
evidence and must isolate specific employment practices that are
responsible for disparities. 28 The plaintiff must go beyond a showing of
imbalance at the employer's bottom line and must allege with

119. See generally Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that a sex-based affirmative action plan was in conflict with Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the employer's affirmative action plan conflicted with the intent of the
Civil Rights Act).
120. Hearingson H.R. l,supra note 4, at 3.
121. Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
122. ld. at 646.
123. Id. at 647-48.
124. Id. at 647.
125. Id. at 647-48.
126. Id.at 649.
127. Id. at 656.
128. Id.
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particularity the specific practice at issue. 129 The Court cited Watson,
and argued that this specific causation requirement is not unduly
burdensome on plaintiffs as they are given liberal discovery rules
130
providing for broad access to information to establish their claims.
Although agreeing with Watson that the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains at all times with the plaintiff, the majority in Ward's Cove
increased the plaintiff's initial burden of making a prima facie case and
at the same time lowered the burden on the employer to show business
necessity. 3 1 Watson established that the employer had the burden of
proving business justification. 32 The majority in Ward's Cove found
that this burden was only one of production and seemed to overlook the
clear wording of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Watson, allocating a
burden of proof to the employer once the plaintiff makes its prima facie
case, although keeping the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff. 33 This arguable misconstruction by Justice White and the
Ward's Cove majority is the fuel for Justice Blackmun's dissent. 134 In
his dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Stevens' argument that
the facts of Ward's Cove are so clearly "overt and institutionalized
discrimination ... [that they] ... resemble[] a plantation economy.' 3 5

It was Watson and Ward's Cove and their inconsistent, quick
expansion and constriction of the disparate impact model that sparked
prompt legislative response through the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.136 As stated in the legislative history, one of the primary
purposes of the 1991 amendments was to "respond to the Supreme
Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that
were dramatically limited by those decisions . . .. ,
Ultimately,
Congress specifically codified "business necessity," a concept judicially
created in Griggs, and overruled
Ward's Cove to the extent it made
138
"business necessity" a defense.
From the time Rehnquist joined the Supreme Court bench in 1972,
just following the establishment of the disparate impact doctrine in
Griggs, Title VII litigation increasingly expanded the application of the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

ld. at657.
Id.
See id. at 659.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997-98 (1988).
Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
See id. at 661 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662.
Hearingson H.R. 1, supra note 4, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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law to employers.'39 Griggs was initially criticized for lacking statutory

basis. 140 However, the doctrine continued to develop and expand,
originally only applying to objective hiring practices, but later to
subjective practices as well. 14 1 Finally, when the Court was viewed to
have gone too far in Ward's Cove, Congress stepped in and amended
Title VII to not only give a statutory basis for the disparate impact
doctrine, but also to expressly overrule the Court's decision in Ward's
Cove. 142 With the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act there was a
shift from litigation defining the contours of disparate impact 143to
litigation applying the newly codified doctrine to other legal contexts.
VI. FROM 1991 TO THE CHANGE OF TIDES IN 2005

After the enactment of the 1991 Amendments, it seemed that
proponents of both sides were able to claim victory. Those representing
plaintiffs were pleased that the restorative effects of the amendments
Victims of employment
after Ward's Cove and Watson.144
discrimination were pleased as they were arguably better compensated
1 46
under the new law, 145 which in tern deterred employer wrongdoing.
President George Bush Sr. and those on the side of employers, also
as denouncing a quota system which
claimed victory as they saw the 'Act
47
monster."'
"litigation
a
be
would
The major focus of Title VII litigation since the 1991 Amendments
has been in the application of the statute of limitations. 148 National R.R.
PassengerCorp. v. Morgan,149 litigated under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Court, concerned employee rights under Title VII. These rights were

139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646 (1987); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
140. See discussion of Griggs critique supra Part I.

141. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
142. Hearings on H.R. 1, supra note 4, at 3.
143. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (making disparate impact
applicable to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
144. Glenn D. Nager & Julia M. Broas, Enforcement Issues: A PracticalOverview, 54 LA. L.
REv. 1473, 1473 (1993).
145. See id. at 1474. In fact, although leading to an interpretive dispute, Section 102 of the

Act, which provides for compensatory and punitive damages, created an "explosion [of] charges...
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . . [I]nformed observers have
attributed a substantial portion of the increased filings to the Civil Rights Act's 'major new
incentives for individuals to sue their current or former employers."' Id. at 1475 (citations omitted).
146. Nager & Broas, supranote 144, at 1482.

147.

Id. at 1473.

148.
149.

Also to be discussed infra Part VII.
536 U.S. 101 (2002).
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again ultimately expanded and it was made easier to file claims of
discrimination with the EEOC.15 0
In National Railroad, an African American employee brought
action against Amtrak for racial discrimination and retaliation under
Title VI. 15 While the Court held that only acts of discrimination within
300 days of the date the employee filed the charge with the EEOC were
actionable under Title VII, if at least some of the discriminatory acts
alleged took place within the statutory period or the acts were part of a
systematic practice of discrimination, the claim was actionable. 152 The
majority decision was over dissenting votes from Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. 153 Conflicted
on the point, the Court held that although discrete discrimination claims
must be filed within the statutory period, hostile work environment
claims are not time-barred
as long as one of the hostile acts falls within
15 4
period.
the statutory
The dissent specifically disagreed with the majority's determination
that hostile work environment claims could be seen as one broad, single
occurrence rather than individual occurrences, some of which may be
time-barred. 155 The dissent argued such a holding may encourage a
plaintiff to "sleep on his or her rights" knowing that as long as some
discriminatory act occurred within the statutory period the action could
stand. 156 Justice O'Connor noted that the majority holding is not only
contrary to the policy behind Title VII, but is also contrary to the
purpose behind a statute of limitations.1 57 The dissent argued that
although each overt act of discrimination that causes injury to the
plaintiff is relevant and starts the tolling of the limitations period, it
should not logically follow that a plaintiff should be permitted to use the
recent injury to obtain damages for a previous act. 158 Therefore, Justice

150. Id. at 105. The court considers what events may permit suit under Title VII outside the
statutory period. Id.
151. Id. at 104.
152. Id. at 105; see also Linda Greenhouse, Court had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on
Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,2002, at A16.
153. Nat'l R.R., 536 U.S. at 104.
154. Id. at 105.
155. Id. at 123-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 125.
157. Id. at 125 ("Statutes of limitation ... promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust
not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." (citing R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))).
158. See id. at 124-25.
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O'Connor, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, would have preferred to
hold in a way that employee rights would be limited based on a strict
adherence to the statutory text, its legislative purpose, and the purpose
behind a statute of limitations.' 59 This line of cases dealing with statute
of limitations issues culminated with Ledbetter,160 which was overruled
in 2009 and is discussed in detail in Part VI.
In sum, although the 1991 Amendments curbed litigation with
regard to the parameters of the disparate impact doctrine, it did not bring
Title VII litigation to a halt. The focus merely shifted.
VII. A

CHANGE OF CHIEF JUSTICE BUT A CONTINUANCE OF

CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

On September 29, 2005, John G. Roberts, a former law clerk for the
late Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Associate Counsel to President
Ronald Reagan, was confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.'6 1
With Roberts' confirmation came a continuation of the conservative
leadership seen on the bench since Chief Justice Burger's tenure. In his
2005 term, Chief Justice Roberts was faced with his first Title VII action
in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.1 62 The
plaintiff, Sheila White, the only woman in her department, replaced a
male co-worker and began to operate the forklift on herjobsite.16 3 White
complained that her supervisor disparaged her and her position in front
of male co-workers, after which he was suspended.' 64 Concurrent with
the suspension, however, White was removed from her forklift
responsibilities and reassigned to lower level tasks. 165 White alleged this
was in response to complaints that a66 "more senior man" should be
assigned the forklift operator position.
Plaintiff White filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that she
was discriminated against on the basis of her gender, as well as in
retaliation for the complaints she made about her supervisor. 16' A few

159. See id. at 124 (stating the dissent would hold that the statute of limitations should apply to
all claims brought under Title VII).

160. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
161. Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme
Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).

162.

548 U.S. 53 (2006).

163.
164.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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months later, she filed a second EEOC claim alleging additional
retaliatory activities, including surveillance monitoring by her
employer. 168 Shortly thereafter, Ms. White and a supervisor had a
disagreement, after which she was deemed to be "insubordinate" and
was suspended without pay. 169 However, following certain internal
company procedures, it was determined that White had not been
insubordinate and she was awarded backpay for the duration of her
suspension. 170 Finally, Ms. White resorted to filing suit for unlawful
retaliation under Title VII. 17 1 A jury ultimately found in her favor and
awarded her compensatory damages.' 72
The Court held that aside from the protections afforded by Title VII
for victims of employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin," there is an additional protection
afforded anyone who has been retaliated against for initiating or
participating in a Title VII proceeding. 73 The Court determined that the
anti-retaliation provision of the Act covers only "employer actions that
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job
applicant"'174 to the extent that it could "dissuade a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' ' 75 The Court
held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. White's suspension
was materially adverse, and affirmed the jury's judgment. 176 Eight of
the Supreme Court justices177joined in this opinion, with Justice Alito
being the sole concurrence.
Similarly, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,178 the majority decision
favored the plaintiff-employee. 79 In this case, an employee sued a
former employer for sexual harassment under Title VII. 18 ° Arbaugh was
employed at a restaurant owned by Y & H.' 8' She alleged that she was
sexually harassed by one of the owners, and that he hastened her

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 58-59.
171. Id. at 59.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 72.
174. Id. at 57.
175. Id.
176. Id, at 70.
177. Id. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring).
178. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
179. Id. at 504, 516 (reversing the Court of Appeals holding which dismissed the plaintiffs
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
180. Id. at 503-04.
181. Id.at507.
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termination with Y & H.' 82 A jury found that Arbaugh had in fact been
the victim of sexual harassment and was constructively discharged, both
actions in violation of Title VII, and awarded her a considerable
verdict.18 3 Subsequently, the employer made a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 84 The basis of the employer's
motion was that it was not an "employer" within the meaning of Title
VII. 185 Under section 2000e(b), an "employer" is someone with fifteen
or more employees. 186 The employer, for the first time on this motion,
argued he did not meet that criteria, and therefore could not be sued
under Title VII, in an attempt to hinge the case on a jurisdictional
issue. 187 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that
"Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement
'jurisdictional' . . . [but] neither § 1331, nor Title VII's jurisdictional
provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), [authorizing jurisdiction over
actions brought under Title VII], specifies
any threshold ingredient akin
' 88
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332's monetary floor."'
Again, eight of the nine Supreme Court justices joined in the
majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg. 189 This time however,
Justice Alito refrained from taking part in the decision. 90 The Court
analyzed a variety of cases in its analysis presenting similar or the same
fact patterns as Arbaugh, and determined that those cases were decided
in favor of the employer because the employee "fail[ed] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted,"' 91 rather than because of a procedural
defect. 192 Therefore,
in fairness to Arbaugh, the Court allowed her claim
193
to proceed.
While the Arbaugh Court in the 2005 term was hesitant to lean in
favor of the employer based on a jurisdictional issue, namely the
employee-numerosity requirement in the Title VII's definition of
"employer," in 2006, it appears the Court was less steady in its
convictions.' 94 In the first Title VII decision of the 2006 term,
182. Id.
183. Id. at 508.
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 514-15.
189. Id. at 502.
190. Id.
191. Id. at512.
192. Id. at 511-12.
193. Id. at 513-14.
194. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (holding against
the plaintiff and narrowly construing the statute of limitations for pay discrimination claims).
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Ledbetter, an employee filed an EEOC charge claiming sex
discrimination, offering into evidence evaluations which showed
disparate pay based on the employee's gender. 95 Ledbetter worked for
Goodyear for almost twenty years, where her pay raises were determined
by supervisor performance evaluations.1 96 In the last year of her
employment, Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC alleging pay
discrimination in violation of Title VII.197 Ledbetter alleged that she had
received poor evaluations based on her gender affecting her pay, which
was considerably less than male employees.1 98 A jury agreed and
awarded her backpay for the discriminatorily lower pay she had been
receiving, as well as damages.1 99 Her employer appealed, alleging that
her discrimination claim was time-barred for the first 18 years of her
employment and that no pay disparity occurred in her last year as an
employee. 200 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that the time bar Goodyear asserted prevented Ledbetter from
bringing suit for the majority of her employment, and that evidence to
show discriminatory pay in her last year of employment was
inadequate.2 1 In her appeal to the Supreme Court, Ledbetter argued that
there was a discriminatory disparity in the paychecks issued to her
during the 180-day time period before she filed suit with the EEOC, and
therefore, her claim is not time-barred, or in the alternative, that the most
recent paychecks she received were lower than deserved because they
were built on disparities from previous years.20 2
The Supreme Court, in a more divided opinion than its previous
Title VII decisions, held that Ledbetter's claim was time-barred because
later effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for filing an
EEOC charge.20 3 To file an EEOC charge asserting a violation of Title
VII, an employee must file the charge "within a specified period (either
180 or 300 days, depending on the State)" identifying the specific
violations alleged.20 4 The Court reasoned that Congress has a "strong

195.

Id. at 621-22.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.at 621.
Id. at 621-22.
Id.at 622.
Id.

200.

Id.

201. Id. at 622-23.
202. Id. at 624.
203. Id. at 623, 637 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) and its time limits). The court was
in a 5-4 split. Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 620.
204. Id. at 623-24.
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preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination"
claims and analogized Ledbetter's case to others where employees were
similarly situated. 20 5 As part of this analysis, the Court noted that
employee's arguments in other cases had been rejected as well, since
although the effects on pay 20may
still have been felt by the employee, no
"present violation existed., 6
The Court rejected that the pay-raise denial in her final year of
employment violated Title VII, triggering a new EEOC charging
period.20 7 The Court said that to seek retribution for those past alleged
violations, Ledbetter should have filed more timely EEOC charges to
receive compensation for them.20 8 Through fault of her own, she did not
file those charges, and the Court says this is enough to prevent her from
bringing such claims at a later date.20 9
Surprisingly, the Ledbetter majority was written by Justice Alito,
who had concurred or not taken part in the last two Title VII decisions,
and he was joined by four other justices.210 Justice Ginsburg dissented,
and was joined by three other justices. 21 1 Ginsburg, a proponent for the
employee in Arbaugh, dissented in Ledbetter in her continued support
for the employee. 12 Ledbetter clearly favors the employer and places
heavy restrictions on employees when the discriminatory effect of an
employer's action does not manifest itself within the time period allotted
for the filing of a charge with the EEOC. 213 The Court seemed intent on
deciding in favor of the employer based on case precedent, and
unwilling to do what some may see as fair.21 4 The dissent expressed its
disdain for the decision because it limits employees' ability to bring suit
due to the rigidity of Ledbetter's inflexible time period requirements.215
205. Id. at 630-32.
206. Id. at 625. See also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104-05 (2002);
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 908 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
254-56 (1980). When a discriminatory act takes place in Violation of Title VII, the time period to
file an EEOC charge begins. This time period does not restart when further "non-discriminatory"
actions are taken that result in discriminatory effects based on the past Title VII violation.
However, any intentional violation results in the time period starting over. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S.
at 623,637 (2007).
207. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628.
208. Id. at 628-29.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 620.
211.

Id.

212. Id. at 643-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
213. See generally id. at 623-24 (holding in favor of the employer by stating that the time to
file a charge was not restarted by "later effects of discrimination") (majority opinion).
214. Seeid. at632.
215. See generally id. at 649-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between
singular discrete acts and acts of pay discrimination).
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The majority ruled that to waver on the issue would frustrate Title
VII's enforcement abilities and its purpose.21 6 However, some argued
that the Court's decision in Ledbetter does in fact frustrate the purpose
of Title VII, as the law was arguably enacted to provide greater remedies
for the employee; and to be flexible enough to accommodate the various
employment discrimination cases that may arise.217 While the time
frame within which to file an EEOC charge is rigid, others argue that
these strict regulations ensure that employers are not defending
themselves against claims brought by employees based on issues from
times gone by, where the surrounding circumstances may no longer
exist.218 In essence, the time bar prevents frivolous claims by
disgruntled employees, unless the employee takes it upon himself or
herself to allege discriminatory impact at or around the time when the
actual act occurs.
Following Ledbetter, in 2008 the Supreme Court heard another
219
Title VII case, Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville.
The Court held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision applies to an
employee who indicates discriminatory activity during an investigation
of another employee's discrimination case. 220 As in Ledbetter, Justice
Alito once again fought for the employer in the concurrence.2 21 In
Crawford, Metropolitan Government (Metro) began investigating
rumors of sexual harassment by Hughes, an employee. 2 During the
course of the investigation, Crawford was questioned and reported
several occurrences of sexual harassment by Hughes, after which she
was terminated, with no action taken against Hughes.223 Metro claimed
that Crawford was terminated for embezzlement, while Crawford argued
she was fired in retaliation for reporting the instances of sexual

216. Id. at 629 (majority opinion).
217. See, e.g., Adrienne Nicole Calloway, Note, 180 Days or No Equal Pay: Limiting
Employment DiscriminationSuits in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 59 MERCER L. REV.
785, 800 (2008) ("The Court in Ledbetter has limited the broad scope of the legislation and made it
more difficult for employees to bring pay discrimination claims. A statute of limitations is essential
... however, Ginsburg argues that courts should not use it to thwart the remedial purpose of Title
VII.").
218. See, e.g., Megan E. Mowrey, DiscriminatoryPay and Title VII: Filing a Timely Claim, 41
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 390 (2008) (quoting a White House statement that asserts allowing
employees to bring suits years after the alleged discrimination "serve[s] to impede justice and
undermine the important goal of having allegations of discrimination expeditiously resolved ....
219. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
220. Id. at 849.
221. Id. at 853 (Alito, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 849 (majority opinion).
223. Id.
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harassment.2 24 Crawford filed a Title VII charge
with the EEOC, then
225
filed suit in the United States District Court.
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision provides, in relevant part, that
an employer cannot discriminate against an employee because the
employee has "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter., 226 The District Court granted Metro summary judgment,
stating that Crawford had not opened an investigation, but rather had
answered questions in an open investigation, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.22 7 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in another
strong decision favoring the employee, stating that "[i]f it were clear law
that an employee who reported discrimination in answering an
employer's questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent
employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII
offenses against themselves or against others. 22 8 To discourage
reporting of unlawful discrimination would severely undermine the
statutory and legislative purpose of Title VII. 229 The case was remanded
because Metro's summary judgment motion contained additional
defenses that had not yet been discussed.230
Justice Alito concurred, emphasizing "that the Court's holding does
not and should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal
investigations ....
,,231 Alito believed that the Court extended protection
too far to those that are silent about a Title VII violation until
questioned, and that doing so would allow many more employees to
bring claims against employers even if they had never given the
employer any notice that such activity was occurring.232
VIII. THE PEOPLE SPEAK: CONGRESS' RESPONSE TO THE LEDBETTER
DECISION

Few decisions have been as controversial as Ledbetter, a decision
that clearly favors employers, and to which there was a strong public
response. 2333 Some argued that the decision would unfairly impact
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id. at 849-50.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
See Crawford, 129 S.Ct. at 850.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 853 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 854.
Calloway, supranote 217, at 796.
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certain employees and "[c]reates [p]erverse [i]ncentives for [e]mployer
[b]ehavior. ' 2 34 This is because the practical effect of Ledbetter was to
"deny remedies to many victims of employment discrimination who do
not file their claims within the brief limitations period., 235 The Court's
strict construction of the allotted time within which to file under
Ledbetter would have had the adverse result of generating obstacles for
employees who intended on bringing suit against their employers when
the discrimination was not immediately noticeable or actionable.23 6
Justice Ginsburg recognized the majority's point that it will be difficult
for employers to defend themselves regarding decisions made a long
237
time ago, and that the time bar will in effect alleviate that difficulty.

However, Ginsburg argued that the employer will not be defending suits
regarding employment decisions made on one instance long ago in the
238
past, but rather instances that occur over a period of time.
Additionally, Ginsburg emphasized her concern for groups protected
under Title VII and their ability to bring successful claims.2 39 She
discussed that the time limit mandated by the Court in Ledbetter will
adversely affect employees' chances of bringing successful claims since
employees will rush to bring suit before the evidence is sufficiently in
their favor to prevent being time-barred.24 °
Ginsburg argued that the decision reinforced employer's retaliatory
abilities since employees will likely bring more unreasonable claims for
fear of being shut out by the statute of limitations. 24 1 This may flood the
court with frivolous lawsuits, wasting time and judicial resources.2 42
Furthermore, Ledbetter could potentially defeat the purpose of Title
VII's internal controls because employers, no longer fearful of employee
suits over pay discrimination, may fail to objectively maintain fair
salaries.2 43
Mostly in response to Justice Ginsburg's dissent, the Lilly

234. Impact of LedbetterDecision on Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws: HearingBefore the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary,110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Martha Chamallas,
Robert J. Lynn Chair, The Ohio State University).
235. Calloway, supranote 217, at 796.

236. Id. at 796-97.
237.

Mowrey, supra note 218, at 354-55.

238. Id.
239. Id. at 354.
240.

Hearing,supra note 234.

241.

Id.

242. Authors predict this will be the result, as is the case when any unreasonable and unripe
cases are brought before the Court.
243. See generally Mowrey, supra note 218, at 392 (stating the result reached in Ledbetter may
"pose significant challenges to potential plaintiffs").
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Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 ("Fair Pay Act") was introduced. 2 " On
January 8, 2009, the Fair Pay Act was introduced in the Senate and
passed by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-six.245 Five days later, the House
also passed the bill (250 to 177), resulting in Congressional unity on this
front.246 On January 29, 2009, the newly elected President Obama,
standing next to Lilly Ledbetter, signed his first bill into law as the Fair
Pay Act.24 7 The Act amends Title VII to recognize "an unlawful
discriminatory action each time an employee is paid after an initial
discriminatory compensation decision. '248 The Act will encourage
"employers to assess whether they engage in gender discrimination on a
continuing basis" to avoid liability at each paycheck issued.249
The uproar following Ledbetter indicated that it might soon be
congressionally overruled. 250 The Fair Pay Act is the legislative outlet
that was used to overrule Ledbetter and further clarify Title VII to
achieve a result more in line with Justice Ginsburg's dissent. 25 1 The
potential limitation to wage discrimination suits suggests that Congress
should broaden the scope of the Act to stretch beyond that of the specific
facts in Ledbetter, in order "to make clear that each application of a
discriminatory policy, whether or not related to compensation,
constitutes an unlawful employment practice. 25 2 The Fair Pay Act
intends to prevent future Courts from applying portions of the holding to
different factual cases brought before the Court, since the legislation
would broadly encompass all discriminatory situations.253
244. Id. at 388.
245. Joanna L. Grossman, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009: President Obama 's First
Signed Bill Restores Essential Protection Against Pay Discrimination, Feb. 13, 2009,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090213.html.
246. Id.
247. Id. President Barack Obama:
Lilly Ledbetter didn't set out to be a trailblazer or a household name. She was just a
good hard worker who did her job-and did it well-for nearly two decades before
discovering that for years, she was paid less than her male colleagues for the very same
work. Over the course of her career, she lost more than $200,000 in salary, and even
more in pension and Social Security benefits-losses she still feels today.
Wage Discrimination Lawsuits (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2009), available at
http://firedoglake.com/2009/01/29/breaking-lilly-ledbetter-fair-pay-act-signed-into-law-bypresident-obama.
248. Calloway, supra note 217, at 798-99.
249. Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & U.L. 555, 581
(2008).
250. See generally Calloway, supra note 217, at 798-801 (discussing Congress' quick reaction
to Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Ledbetter).
251. See Kathryn A. Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow
Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 972 (2008).
252. Id.
253. See id.
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Some argued that the Fair Pay Act would result in the opposite of
what it intended to achieve. 254 "Courts may assume that because
Congress reconsidered the issue decided in Ledbetter and did not
abrogate parts of the Court's decision, it intended to acquiesce to the
Court's interpretation in the portions of the decision that were not
overridden specifically., 255 Essentially, the argument is that courts may
infer from Congress changing only one part of the statute at issue that
Congress intended the other part of the statute to remain intact. 256 This
might lend itself to the argument that the Fair Pay Act would actually
strengthen Ledbetter's authority.25 7
However, even facing staunch opposition from a variety of class
and party lines, the Fair Pay Act was successfully passed, effectively
overruling the majority's decision in Ledbetter.258 "The Act restores the
pre-Ledbetter position of the EEOC that each paycheck that delivers
discriminatory compensation is a wrong actionable under the federal
EEO statutes, regardless of when the discrimination began." 259 The Fair
Pay Act covers discriminatory compensation claims retroactively as of
May 28, 2007, and re-extends the time within which employees can sue
employers for wage based discrimination. 260 The signing of the Act has
been lauded by many, including Stuart Ishimaru, Acting Chairman of the
EEOC. 26'
The Act, while especially beneficial for women receiving lower pay
than their male counterparts, is also a huge leap forward for all unfairly
paid workers that may not realize they have a right to legal recourse. 262
Furthermore, the Act reestablishes Congressional intent in protecting
workers from discrimination. 263 "The Act states that with respect to pay
discrimination, an unlawful employment practice occurs 'each time
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in
part from [a pay] decision or other practice. ' ' ' 264 While the Act will not
254. Id. (discussing the limitations of the Fair Pay Act).
255. Id. at 974.
256. Id. at 974-75.
257. Id.
258. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NOTICE CONCERNING THE LILY
LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epa-ledbetter.cfm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).

259. Id.
260. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Acting EEOC
Chairman Ishimaru Lauds Final Passage and Signing of Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Jan. 29,
2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/press/l-29-09.html [hereinafter EEOC Press Release].
261. EEOC Press Release, supra note 260.
262. See id.

263. Id.
264. Id.
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apply retroactively to Lilly Ledbetter herself, its impact will be felt by
other employees facing wage discrimination.2 65
IX. READING THE CRYSTAL BALL: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

On January 20, 2009, there was an ideological shift in the United
States with the presidential inauguration of Barack H. Obama.26 6
Obama, a liberal Democrat and the 44th President of the United
States, 6 7 is a stark contrast to his predecessor, a conservative
Republican, George W. Bush. With such a sweeping change of political
ideology in the White House, changes in Title VII, and antidiscrimination law more generally, are likely.
In addition to a presidential change, there were also changes in the
membership of the Supreme Court following the retirement of Justice
Souter in 2009.268 Supreme Court appointments are rare due to the
lifelong term of the Justices, thus each appointment has significant
results.26 9 Specifically, a new Chief Justice appointment impacts the
decision-making process of the Court, as it did in 2005 with the
appointment of Chief Justice Roberts.27 ° Often, changes in the makeup
of the Supreme Court are responsible for changes in constitutional
law. 27' Additionally, while cases on the docket may result in surprising
verdicts, cases that have already been decided are in danger of reversal,
272
A single
particularly those confronting explosive political issues.
The new law adds a provision to Title VII, which provides: "unlawful employment
practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title,
when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an
individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice."
Grossman, supra note 245.
265. Id.
266. Barack
Obama,
CHI.
TRIB.,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/politics/govemmentibarack-obama-PEPLT007408.topic
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
267. The
White
House,
President
Barack
Obama,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-obama/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
268. Souter Confirms Supreme Court Retirement, CBS NEWS, May 1, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/30/national/main4981868.shtml.
269. Jeannine R. Reardon, Selecting Supreme Court Justices: Preserving the System,
Protecting With Professionalism,40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 861, 863 (2007).
270. See generally David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court
Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 39-41 (1996) (explaining the potential shift in ideologies within the
Supreme Court when a new Justice is appointed).
271. Id. at 37.
272. Id. at 38-39.
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Justice may be responsible for the "swing vote," and entirely shift the
anticipated direction of the court and the law. 273 Based on previous Title
VII cases decided so far under the current Court, predictions can be
made as to future outcomes.
As Roberts was appointed to replace Rehnquist, and Alito was set
to replace O'Connor, the Court appeared to be moving in a more
conservative direction.274 Justices Scalia and Alito have been vocal,
poignant, and opinionated conservative jurists in many of the Title VII
decisions discussed in this note, and have helped to shape the law as we
know it today.21 5
We have also witnessed the response from the legislative and
executive branches to the Court's Title VII decisions, most recently
regarding the Ledbetter decision. Both Congress and President Obama
took a large step toward ensuring compensation equality, with the
passage of the Fair Pay Act, all within the first few days of Obama
taking office.276
In May 2009, Obama appointed Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the
Supreme Court, a judge appointed by President Clinton to sit on the
Second United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

277

Sotomayor, a New

York native, was a United States District Court judge appointed by
President George H.W. Bush in 1992.278

On August 8, 2009, Justice

Sotomayor became the 11 th Supreme Court Justice after a swearing in
ceremony administered by Chief Justice Roberts. 279 A graduate of
Princeton University and Yale Law School, Sotomayor was an Assistant
District Attorney in Manhattan before becoming a judge.280
She
received widespread Democratic support, and a general wariness from
Republicans. 281 Through her years as a District Court judge in the
Southern District of New York, Sotomayor has decided a fair amount of
labor and employment decisions, yet it is unclear as to whether her
273. Tony Mauro, Is the Honeymoon Over for the Roberts' Court?, LEGAL TIMES, July 5,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 151658325717.
274. Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 815 (2005).
275. See supra Part VII.
276. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
277. Hamby et al., supra note 13.
278. Id.

279. David G. Savage, Sonia Sotomayor's Swearing In: History, THE SWAMP,
http://www.swamppolities.com/news/politics/blog/2009/08/sonia sotomayors swearingin-hi I .htm
I (posted Aug. 8, 2009).
280. Nico Pitney, Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court Nominee: All You Need to Know, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, June

1, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/01/sonia-sotomayor-

supreme-cn 194470.html.
281. Id.
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support lies with the employer or employee.2 82
While Judge Sotomayor has more experience in the area of labor and
employment law than other recent Supreme Court appointees, her
record does not, as some might expect, place her on the pro-employee
end of the spectrum. Given the number of pro-employer decisions she
has issued over the years, she appears to take a flexible approach to
labor and employment law cases.
The appointment of Justice Sotomayor could result in a major shift
and potentially balance out the views of staunch conservatives such as
Scalia and Alito. We have not seen liberal justices appointed to the
bench since President Clinton's time.284 In fact, only three liberal
justices, including Justice Sotomayor, have been appointed since
President Nixon was in office.285
President Obama has also appointed Hilda Solis, a California
Democratic Representative, to the position of Secretary of Labor, a
prominent position in his presidential cabinet.286 Ms. Solis is "the first
Latina ...to be appointed to a senior post in a cabinet level department,
according to the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed
She was appointed after a period of turmoil between
Officials ....
Republicans and Democrats, and was overwhelmingly chosen by
Democrats to represent the voices of the working people of the United
States (fifty-four Democrats, twenty-four Republicans, and two
Independents outvoted the seventeen Republicans against placing Solis
in office).288
Significantly, Solis has voted in support of prohibiting job
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.28 9 While the statutory

282. Jackson Lewis LLP, Supreme Court Nominee Sotomayor's Record in Labor and
Law
Cases
Reveals
Balanced
Approach,
May
29,
2009,
Employment
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=l 736.
283. Id.
284. See Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United
States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members-text.aspx (last visited April 10, 2010). Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer were both appointed during President Clinton's term. Id.
285. See id.
the
Secretary
of
Labor,
286. U.S.
Dep't
of
Labor--Office
of

http://www.dol.gov/_sec/welcome.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
287.
18:39

Tyche Hendricks, Hilda Solis Confirmed as Labor Secretary--Finally, (Feb. 24. 2009,
EST)
http:/lwww.sfgate.com/cgi-biniblogs/sfgate/detail?blogid=14&entry-id=36224

[hereinafter Solis Confirmed].
288.

Mike

Hall,

Senate Confirms

Hilda Solis as

Labor Secretary, (Feb.

24, 2009)

http:/lblog.aflcio.org/2009/02/24/senate-confirms-solis-as-labor-secretary/.
289. On the Issues, Hilda Solis on Civil Rights,
http:/www.ontheissues.org/CA/HildaSolis-Civil-Rights.htm.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/5

(last

visited

April

10,

2009)

32

Crabtree and Stock: The 45Th Anniversary of Title VII: Where We are, Where We've Been

20101

THE 45THANNIVERSARY OF TITLE VII

language of Title VII does not include sexual orientation as a protected
classification prohibiting discrimination on that basis in the workplace,
nineteen states have passed laws prohibiting discrimination on that
basis. 290 Solis supports adding that classification to the list of other
protected classes within the realm of Title VII. 29 1 Solis' support for
expanding the classes of protected individuals under Title VII seems to
indicate that the spirit and purpose of Title VII, alluded to in the
disparate impact cases from the 1970s through the early 1990s, will be
upheld, despite a 6-3 conservative majority on the Court. Perhaps the
scope of Title VII protections will even be broadened while she presides
as Secretary of Labor. Additionally, Solis is "expected to increase the
Labor Department's focus on protecting worker health and safety and
enforcing wage and hour laws" by making recommendations from the
executive branch of the government for employers across the country.2 92
Following the congressional reversal of Ledbetter and the signing
of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, it is unclear where future Title VII
cases are headed, specifically in the realm of statute of limitations issues,
and how a change in the Supreme Court bench will affect their
outcomes. However, if Obama's first few weeks in office are any
indication of what the future brings, it appears that employees have a lot
of support on their side. 93 With a new President paving the way
through critical appointments to the Supreme Court bench, perhaps there
will be a shift in the Supreme Court ideology regarding Title VII and
other employment decisions as well. Additionally, the appointment of
Hilda Solis, a woman who fiercely fights for workers' rights, will likely
continue to provide remedies for the employee.
There is now a place in history for Lilly Ledbetter, a woman who
fought so that others could have their day in court. Employers may
argue that their rights are largely being abrogated with the recent
political developments in the Title VII realm; however, that argument
will likely receive opposition in this new, more liberal, political climate.
Similarly, the Fair Pay Act codified the Congressional intent
regarding the language of Title VII, and employers must act accordingly.
Despite legislative and executive support for employee rights, it seems
the only wild card for pro-employee advocates to question now is Justice
Sonia Sotomayor. While Obama, in signing the Fair Pay Act, acted as
an employee advocate, it will be interesting to see how his appointment

290. Id.
291. See id.
292. Solis Confirmed, supra note 287.
293. See supra discussion of Fair Pay Act Part VIII.
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of Sotomayor, replacing Justice Souter, who was called "a conservative
man in the old-fashioned sense of the term," will swing cases up for
review over the next four years.294
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